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Abstract
This paper presents a di¤erence in the comparative statics of general equilibrium models with
land when there are nitely many agents, and when there is a continuum of agents. Restricting
attention to quasi-linear and Cobb-Douglas utility, it is shown that with nitely many agents, an
increase in the (marginal) commuting cost increases land rent per unit (that is, land rent averaged
over the consumers equilibrium parcel) paid by the consumer located at each xed distance from
the central business district. In contrast, with a continuum of agents, average land rent goes
up for consumers at each xed distance close to the central business district, is constant at some
intermediate distance, and decreases for locations farther away. Therefore, there is a qualitative
di¤erence between the two types of models, and this di¤erence is potentially testable.
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1 Introduction
Models with a continuum of consumers are often employed for reasons of mathematical convenience
or simplicity. Moreover, they can make precise the notion of perfect competition. As the number
of agents in the world is nite, models with an innite number of agents are not realistic unless
they are close to models with a nite number of agents, in terms of equilibria and comparative
statics. The scattered literature on general equilibrium models with land has tried to investigate
the similarity or dissimilarity between the equilibria of these two types of models. This line of
inquiry has met with limited success only; see McLean and Muench (1981), Berliant (1985, 1991),
Asami et al. (1991), Kamecke (1993), Papageorgiou and Pines (1990), and Berliant and ten Raa
(1991). The intuition for the dissimilarity between the models is that any partition of a -nite
measure space, such as a Euclidean space, can have only countably many elements of positive
measure. So except for a negligible set of consumers out of a continuum, all must consume or even
be endowed with a set of measure zero. A corollary is that economies with a nite number of
consumers approximating these continuum economies must have land consumption or endowments
tending to zero almost surely.
What is the economic signicance of this issue? To address this question, it is important
to distinguish between models and the real world. Regarding models, the ones with land and a
continuum of consumers have an inconsistency embedded in them; see Berliant (1985). Regarding
the real world, when we test a models implications with real data, we are necessarily testing
implications for its analog with a nite number of consumers. Thus, if a model with a continuum
of agents di¤ers from its analog with a nite number of agents, either in terms of equilibria or
comparative statics, then empirical analysis of a model with a continuum of agents is necessarily
suspect, because data for a world with a continuum of agents is unavailable.
This paper presents a dissimilarity in the comparative statics of these two types of models in
the cases of quasi-linear and Cobb-Douglas utility functions. The comparative static of interest
here is the e¤ect of a change in marginal commuting cost on the per unit land rent paid, averaged
over a consumers equilibrium parcel, for the consumer who owns land at a given distance from
the Central Business District (CBD). The model considered here is the standard closed city model
(with an exogenous CBD and an endogenous city boundary). It is shown that when the number of
agents is nite, an increase in the (marginal) commuting cost increases average land rent paid by
the consumer owning land at any given distance from the CBD. In contrast, the canonical result
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when there is a continuum of agents is that average land rent goes up for consumers who own
land at locations close to the CBD, is constant at some intermediate distance, and decreases for
consumers farther away; see, for example, Fujita (1989, p. 81, Proposition 3.14, part (iii)).
This is important for both urban economic theory and empirical work. On the theoretical
front, this result shows that models with a nite number of consumers are qualitatively di¤erent
from models with a continuum of consumers, and therefore, in general, it is impossible to conclude
that their equilibria are similar. On the empirical front, this result provides a potentially testable
prediction. We shall discuss the empirical implications in the conclusions below.
Recent literature on city formation, for example Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002), or the
new economic geography, for example Fujita and Thisse (2002), generally employ a continuum
of consumers and ordinarily have land as a commodity at least implicitly. We have postulated in
our work an exogenously given CBD. In most models of city formation, the CBD or location of
rms is endogenous, and there is an agglomeration externality used to determine these locations.
However, these models all have embedded in them a model of consumer location and commuting,
making our analysis relevant. For example, conditional on the spatial distribution of rms, one
might want to consider the consumer location problem.
It is important to be precise about the particular comparative static we consider. This com-
parative static is exactly the same as the standard one considered by Fujita for the continuous
agent model. Specically, in either model consider a given distance from the CBD such that land
at that distance is not used for agriculture. The person or persons residing at that distance from
the CBD in equilibrium pays a certain average price for land (where the average is taken over their
entire parcel). Now change the marginal commuting cost. If land at that xed distance from
the CBD is not used for agriculture, examine the average price for land paid by the consumer who
lives there in equilibrium. This consumer might not be the same as the person who lived there
in the equilibrium under the old commuting cost. How does the average price of land change?
We claim that this is the comparative static of empirical relevance, since land price as a function
of distance from the CBD is generally what is observed. Moreover, since we do not observe land
prices interior to the parcel, but rather the price function averaged over the entire parcel, we study
the latter. In other words, the genesis of this project was to construct the discrete model analog
of Fujitas (1989) comparative static, rather than begin with our comparative static and construct
the analog in the continuous agent model.
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As pointed out by several readers, there is another, closely related comparative static that has
the same sign for both the continuous and discrete agent models. Consider the following exercise.
In either the continuous or discrete model, x a commuting cost and equilibrium. Number the
consumers from the CBD outward;1 each pays a certain average price for their land parcel. Now
change the marginal commuting cost. There is a new equilibrium. Since all consumers are
identical, they can be numbered arbitrarily from the CBD outward. Maintain the order from the
old equilibrium. In general, for the linear city model, the change in the average price paid in
equilibrium by each consumer in the continuum and the nite models has the same sign as the
change in the marginal commuting cost. We have presented this alternative comparative static for
clarity, to emphasize what we are doing in this paper and what we are not doing. It is our view
that this second comparative static is not of empirical relevance, since it is di¢ cult to keep track
of agentslocations after a change in commuting cost. In contrast, it is easy to keep track of the
per unit price of a parcel at a given location, though the inhabitants may change with a change in
commuting cost. It is clearly the case that there are comparative statics that will agree for the
two models, in sign if not in magnitude, and others that di¤er.
The intuition behind our result is as follows. Fix an arbitrary inhabited location in the city,
but close to the city edge. For the model with a continuum of agents, when commuting cost rises,
in equilibrium the density of agents at the given location goes down, as they relocate to locations
closer to the CBD. Thus, demand for the xed supply of land at that location is reduced, so
price goes down. In the model with a nite number of consumers, in equilibrium the number of
consumers demanding land at that location is always 1. There is no margin on which to adjust
density. The consumer who owns land at that location is squeezed by the increased commuting
cost. If the income e¤ect on consumption good is small, expenditure on land must go down, or its
average price goes up whereas parcel size shrinks.
As a referee has pointed out, we demonstrate a di¤erence in a comparative static between the
model with a continuum of consumers and the model with a nite number of consumers. As
enumerated above, many have tried various di¤erent methods to connect the two models. Some
attempts involve trying to show directly that models with a continuum of agents and models with
a xed, nite number of agents have the same equilibria. Our results address these attempts.
1There are some technical issues involved in such a numbering for the continuous model, but they will be ignored
here.
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The more classical literature tries to connect the two types of models by approximating the model
with a continuum of agents by taking the limit of models with a nite number of agents, where the
number of agents tends to innity. Our results also apply here, since they are independent of the
number of agents in the nite model.
In the next section we introduce the notation and present the comparative static in the case of
quasi-linear and Cobb-Douglas utility for the model with a nite number of consumers. This is
essentially the model of Berliant and Fujita (1992) but with an endogenous city boundary that is
determined using an exogenous agricultural land rent. The last section presents our conclusions.
An appendix contains a complementary theorem on existence of equilibrium for the closed city
model where the extent of the city is endogenous and determined by agricultural land rent.2
2 Increasing Rents per Unit Parcel
2.1 Notation
Consider the standard general equilibrium model with a linear city (the CBD at 0) and endogenous
city size, l. Suppose there are N  2 agents. Each agents utility function is the same and is given
by u(s; z), where s is the size of their land parcel and z is consumption of a composite numéraire.
Land is assumed to be a normal good. In addition to (s; z), an agent chooses the location of their
lot, where the front door is at distance x from the CBD. Each agent has the same endowment w of
the numéraire. In order to consume z, an agent has to commute to the CBD to earn income. The
exogenous cost of commuting is t > 0 per unit distance to the CBD, and is measured in terms of
the numéraire. For the discrete model that is the focus of this paper, the distance to the CBD is
measured from the front door location, x. Land price per unit is given by a density p. Agricultural
rent outside the city is given by  > 0.
As usual in this model, an agents budget constraint is given by z +
R x+s
x p(s)ds  w   tx. In
other words, total spending of an agent on consumption of z units of the numéraire, and a lot of
size s at distance x from CBD, is less than or equal to the agents endowment less the commuting
cost tx.
2Although equilibrium in the quasi-linear utility case is found explicitly, the Cobb-Douglas case yields a model
with no known result on existence of equilibrium. Of course, without such a result the comparative static could be
vacuous.
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An equilibrium is given by a collection (sn; zn)Nn=1, and a price density function p such that
consumers are optimizing and markets clear. Agent marginal rates of substitution, land price, and
agricultural rent determine the city size endogenously, as the sum of individual parcel sizes.
2.2 Equilibrium Parcels and Their Comparative Statics
As in Berliant and Fujita (1992), let Z(s; u) be the level of consumption required to achieve utility
u, when lot size is s. That is, Z(; u) is the equation of the indi¤erence curve for utility u. Let
(; )   Z(; ). Then, using results from Berliant and Fujita (1992), s > 0, ss < 0, u < 0, and
su > 0. Notice that s(s; u) is the (negative of) slope of an indi¤erence curve, and hence it is a
marginal rate of substitution.
Consider an equilibrium allocation (sn; zn)Nn=1, and let equilibrium utility levels be (un)Nn=1.
Notice that as agents have the same endowments and utility function, equilibrium utility levels are
identical: u1 = u2 =    = uN . As usual, we label agents by their distance from the CBD, with
agent 1 being closest to the CBD and agent N being farthest away from the CBD. Moreover, as
shown in Berliant and Fujita (1992), an equilibrium land price function is one that is monotonically
non-increasing over distance from the CBD, and has the following form. Over agent 1s parcel, the
price is constant at that persons equilibrium MRS; over agent 2s parcel, at the front end, the
price decreases as the MRS of agent 1 until it hits the level of agent 2s MRS, and then stays at
the level of agent 2s equilibrium MRS; over agent 3s parcel, at the front end, the price decreases
as the MRS of agent 2 until it hits the level of agent 3s equilibrium MRS, and then stays at the
level of agent 3s equilibrium MRS; and so on.
As usual, rst order conditions imply that in equilibrium,
s(s

n; u

n) = s(s

n+1; u

n+1) + t; for n = 1; : : : ; N   1; and
s(s

n; u

n) =  for n = N:
In particular, s(s

N ; u

N ) =  implies that s(s

N 1; u

N 1) =  + t, and proceeding inductively,
s(s

N k; u

N k) =  + kt, for k = 0; : : : ; N   1. Changing index yields
s(s

n; u

n) =  + (N   n)t n = 1; : : : ; N: (1)
This provides a relationship between equilibrium marginal rates of substitution in terms of the
exogenous parameter of interest t. The relationship is helpful in proving the main result in this
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paper. Toward that goal, the comparative statics of the equilibrium parcel sizes are computed rst,
as follows.
The relationship (1) implies that for n = 1; : : : ; N ,
N   n = @
@t
s(s

n; u

n) = ss(s

n; u

n)
@sn
@t
+ su(s

n; u

n)
@un
@t
:
Equation (1) helps determine how equilibrium parcel size changes with respect to t, as follows. As
ss < 0, and su > 0, it follows that for n = 1; : : : ; N ,
@un
@t
< 0 ) @s

n
@t
< 0:
Recall that u1 = u2 =    = uN . Moreover, as land is a normal good, for agent 1 (closest to the
CBD), @u

1
@t < 0. These observations imply that for n = 1; : : : ; N ,
(N   n)  su(sn; un)@u

n
@t
ss(s

n; u

n)
=
@sn
@t
< 0:
Thus, for each agent, as commuting cost increases, the equilibrium parcel size, (and therefore, city
size) decreases.
2.3 Equilibrium Prices and Rents
For notational convenience, write u1 = u2 =    = uN  u, and write sn as sn. With this
convention, as is well-known, the equilibrium price density is as follows.
p(s) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
s(s1; u) on [0; s1]
s(s 
Pn 1
k=1 sk; u) on
hPn
k=1 sk;
Pn 1
k=1 sk + sn+1
i
n = 1; : : : ; N   1;
s(sn+1; u) on
hPn 1
k=1 sk + sn+1;
Pn+1
k=1 sk
i
n = 1; : : : ; N   1;
where, for n = 1,
Pn 1
k=1 sk  0:
Dene the total land rent paid by consumer n to be
rentn =
Z Pn
k=1 skPn 1
k=1 sk
p(s)ds
2.4 Comparative Statics of Rent per Unit Parcel
This subsection presents the main comparative static result. Fix a distance x from the CBD.
Suppose, with only a slight loss of generality, that there is some consumer n such that at the initial
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equilibrium x is interior to the parcel. We inquire how average land rent, or rent per unit, for the
consumer that owns land at x changes with respect to transport cost; that is, @@t

rentn
sn

.
Theorem 1: If utility is quasi-linear, u(s; z) = v(s)+z (where v is increasing and concave), or
if utility is Cobb-Douglas, u(s; z) = sz1  (where  2 (0; 1)), then for n = 1; :::; N , @@t(rentnsn ) > 0.
Hence, almost surely for x 2 [0; l) (namely for x not equal to the front or back of any initial
equilibrium parcel) the average price paid by the consumer who owns land at x rises.3
Proof: Notice that rent1 = s(s1; u)s1, and therefore,
@
@t

rent1
s1

=
@
@t
s(s1; u) =
@
@t
( + (N   1)t) = N   1 > 0:
Therefore, for the rst agent, rent per unit increases with commuting cost. Moreover, for n =
1; : : : ; N   1,
rentn+1 =
RPn 1
k=1 sk+sn+1Pn
k=1 sk
s(s 
Pn 1
k=1 sk; u)ds+
RPn+1
k=1 skPn 1
k=1 sk+sn+1
s(sn+1; u)ds
= (sn+1; u)  (sn; u) + s(sn+1; u)sn
= (sn+1; u)  (sn; u) + ( + (N   n  1)t)sn:
Consequently, for n = 1; : : : ; N   1,
@
@t

rentn+1
sn+1

= 1
s2n+1
sn+1
h
s(sn+1; u)
@sn+1
@t + u(sn+1; u)
@u
@t   s(sn; u)@sn@t   u(sn; u)@u@t
i
  1
s2n+1
[(sn+1; u)  (sn; u)] @sn+1@t
+ 1
s2n+1
sn+1

sn(N   n  1) + s(sn+1; u)@sn@t

  1
s2n+1
s(sn+1; u)sn
@sn+1
@t
= 1
s2n+1
sn+1 [u(sn+1; u)  u(sn; u)] @u@t
+ 1
s2n+1
sn+1sn(N   n  1)
+ 1
s2n+1
sn+1 [s(sn+1; u)  s(sn; u)] @sn@t
+ 1
s2n+1
[s(sn+1; u)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1; u)  (sn; u))] @sn+1@t :
3Technically, if the land parcel of consumer n is represented as [xn; xn + sn), then the comparative static for an
increase in the marginal commuting cost works ne except at l. However, for a decrease in the marginal commuting
cost, we must exclude the boundary points between parcels.
7
As lot sizes are positive, the above relationship implies that for n = 1; : : : ; N   1,
@
@t

rentn+1
sn+1

> 0 , sn+1sn(N   n  1) + sn+1 [u(sn+1; u)  u(sn; u)] @u@t
+ sn+1 [s(sn+1; u)  s(sn; u)] @sn@t
+ [s(sn+1; u)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1; u)  (sn; u))] @sn+1@t > 0:
(2)
Notice that the rst term on the right-hand side is non-negative, the third term is positive because
ss < 0 implies that s(sn+1; u)   s(sn; u) < 0 and that @sn@t < 0, and the fourth term is positive
because (; u) is concave and @sn+1@t < 0. In general, the second term is non-positive, because
su  0 implies that u is (weakly) increasing in s, sn < sn+1, and @u@t < 0. Thus, in general, it is
possible that the expression on the right-hand size is not positive. However, as documented next,
the expression on the right-hand size is positive for the frequently-used classes of quasi-linear and
Cobb-Douglas utility.
For quasi-linear utility, the second term above equals zero, as follows. Write u(s; z) = v(s) + z,
where v is increasing and concave, and notice that (s; u) = v(s)  u. Consequently, u =  1 and
su = 0. In particular, u does not depend on s, and the second term above equals zero. Therefore,
in the case of quasi-linear utility, for every n, @@t

rentn
sn

> 0.
For Cobb-Douglas utility, the entire expression above is positive, as follows. For notational
convenience, the argument u in the functions , s, ss, u, and su is suppressed for now. Notice
that for n = 1; : : : ; N   1, sn+1sn(N   n   1)  0 implies that in order to conclude that for
n = 1; : : : ; N   1, @@t

rentn+1
sn+1

> 0, it is su¢ cient to show that
[s(sn+1)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1)  (sn))] @sn+1@t
+ sn+1 [s(sn+1)  s(sn)] @sn@t
+ sn+1 [u(sn+1)  u(sn)] @u@t > 0:
Using the equilibrium relationship that for n = 1; : : : ; N ,
@sn
@t
=
(N   n)  su(sn)@u@t
ss(sn)
;
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the expression on the left-hand side of the above inequality can be written as follows.
[s(sn+1)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1)  (sn))] (N n 1) su(sn+1)
@u
@t
ss(sn+1)
+ sn+1 [s(sn+1)  s(sn)] (N n) su(sn)
@u
@t
ss(sn)
+ sn+1 [u(sn+1)  u(sn)] @u@t
= [s(sn+1)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1)  (sn))] (N n 1)ss(sn+1)
+ sn+1 [s(sn+1)  s(sn)] (N n)ss(sn)
+ [s(sn+1)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1)  (sn))]  su(sn+1)ss(sn+1)
@u
@t
+ sn+1 [s(sn+1)  s(sn)]  su(sn)ss(sn)
@u
@t
+ sn+1 [u(sn+1)  u(sn)] @u@t :
For this last expression, notice that the rst term is non-negative, and the second term is positive.
In the case of Cobb-Douglas utility, the sum of the remaining three terms equals zero, as shown
below.
Consider the utility function, u(s; z) = sz1 . Then
(s; u) =  u
1
1 
s

1 
s(s; u) =

1 
u
1
1 
s
1
1 
ss(s; u) =   (1 )2 u
1
1 
s
1
1 +1
u(s; u) =   11  u

1 
s

1 
su(s; u) =

(1 )2
u

1 
s
1
1 
su
ss
(s; u) =   su :
Therefore,
sn+1 [u(sn+1)  u(sn)]   sn+1 [s(sn+1)  s(sn)] su(sn)ss(sn)
  [s(sn+1)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1)  (sn))] su(sn+1)ss(sn+1)
=   11 u

1  sn+1
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!
+ 1 u
1
1 
 
1
s
1
1 
n+1
  1
s
1
1 
n
!
sn+1sn
u
+
"

1 (sn+1   sn)u
1
1 
s
1
1 
n+1
+ u
1
1 
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!#
sn+1
u
=  u

1 
1  sn+1
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!
+ 1 u

1  snsn+1
s
1
1 
n+1
  1 u

1  sn+1
s

1 
n
+ 1 u

1  sn+1
s

1 
n+1
  1 u

1  snsn+1
s
1
1 
n+1
+ u

1  sn+1
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!
=  u

1 
1  sn+1
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!
+ u

1  sn+1
 
  1  1
s

1 
n
+ 1 
1
s

1 
n+1
+ 1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!
= u

1 
"
  sn+11 
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!
+ sn+11 
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!#
= 0:
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Consequently,
[s(sn+1)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1)  (sn))]  su(sn+1)ss(sn+1)
@u
@t
+ sn+1 [s(sn+1)  s(sn)]  su(sn)ss(sn)
@u
@t
+ sn+1 [u(sn+1)  u(sn)] @u@t
= 0:
Therefore, in the case of Cobb-Douglas utility, for every n, @@t

rentn
sn

> 0. For any x in the
interior of a parcel, the person who purchases land at location x in equilibrium does not change
with a small change in t.
It is useful at this point to make some remarks about the proof and possible extensions. The
important equation to focus on to make the results more general is (2); in particular, the second term
on the right hand side is possibly negative, and in this case the result might not hold. In particular,
a su¢ cient condition for the second term to be small in absolute value is that j u(s; u)@u@t j is small,
or that the income e¤ect for numéraire is small. A referee has noted that since the income e¤ect
for quasi-linear utility is zero and that the income and substitution e¤ects for Cobb-Douglas utility
cancel, that is the reason the sum of terms beyond the rst must be zero. Although, given the
values of other exogenous parameters, presuming a small enough income e¤ect is su¢ cient, other
variables do matter. For example, the second term involves a factor sn+1, and thus agricultural
land rent plays an indirect role in the sign of (2). Moreover, there is more slack in the equation due
to the rst term, since it is always positive. It seems that the necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for our result to hold are likely to be complicated. Alternatively, replacing functional forms with a
small income e¤ect in the su¢ ciency assumptions of our theorem is likely to exclude Cobb-Douglas
utility.
3 Conclusions
We have examined a comparative static in closed city models with an endogenous city boundary and
a nite number of consumers. We have compared it to the analogous comparative static derived
in Fujita (1989) for the model with a continuum of consumers, and we have found a di¤erence.
For researchers in urban economic theory, the implication is that there are qualitative di¤erences
between the models. For empiricists, the possibility of testing the models against one another is
real.
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Although the quasi-linear and Cobb-Douglas utility cases are su¢ cient to make our point that
the comparative statics in the model with a nite number of consumers and the model with a
continuum of consumers can di¤er,4 the analogous comparative static for general utility functions
seems di¢ cult, or at least algebraically burdensome. But even the result for Cobb-Douglas utility
must be backed up by a theorem on existence of equilibrium for the nite model with an endogenous
city boundary.5 We provide this theorem in a brief appendix below.
Which model, nite or continuum of agents, will be veried empirically? Probably this depends
on the context. One obvious way to test the models is to look at the per unit cost of land parcels
at each xed distance from the CBD in a city, say Chicago, before and after a change in commuting
cost, say the introduction of a new elline. The work of McMillen and McDonald (2004) should
be useful. Our model does not account for rm relocation and its impact on the comparative static,
so this must be controlled for in empirical applications.
It is unclear if the di¤erence in the comparative static presented extends to other comparative
statics as well. However, we conjecture that comparative statics that exploit the general notion
that the equilibrium density of agents at a xed location can change in the model with a continuum
of agents but not for the nite model can di¤er in sign or magnitude.
4 Appendix
Theorem 1 Under standard regularity assumptions on the utility function (Berliant and Fujita,
1992, Assumption 1) there exists an equilibrium.
Proof: For p1  +(N  1)t, construct xn+1(p1), the sum of consumersMarshallian demand
for land when consumer 1 (the consumer closest to the CBD) faces price p1, as in Berliant and
Fujita (1992, pp. 561-562). Set l = xn+1(p1). Apply Berliant and Fujita (1992, Proposition
4): under Assumption 1 of their paper, for any xed l > 0, there exists an equilibrium. This
equilibrium will have the property that the marginal willingness to pay for land of consumer N ,
the outermost consumer, is equal to the agricultural land rent.
4 It is easy to verify that the result in Fujita (1989) applies to quasi-linear utility.
5Notice that existence of equilibrium in the case of quasi-linear utility is not an issue, since we can nd the
equilibrium explicitly using rst order conditions, and thus we have proved that it exists. For more detail and a
graphical depiction of the nite model, see Berliant and LaFountain (2006).
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